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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explain why Egypt’s transition from authoritarianism 
has so-far failed, while Tunisia’s is still moving forward. By using relevant theories 
within the field of democratization and transitology, this study examines three 
crucial differences in the two cases, which explain the difference in their respective 
outcomes. These three underlying differences are in the two cases’ military-
influence, political society, and international pressure. This paper shows how the 
presence or absence of these influential factors have been a big part in determining 
Egypt and Tunisia’s transitional success. To compliment the study, six in-depth 
interviews with journalists, activists, analysts, and bloggers have been conducted – 
giving me a deeper understanding of the two cases and my study itself.  
Why was there an authoritarian counter-coup in Egypt, but not in Tunisia? 
Keywords: Egypt, Tunisia, Democratization, Transition, Authoritarianism 
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1 Introduction 
 
Until this day, democracy has proven, provisionally, to be the least harmful form of 
government – making it desirable for many people. In countries that lack key 
democratic institutions, or democracy itself, democratization is a process that is 
meant to lead said countries on a path towards democracy.  
Egypt and Tunisia are interesting cases to compare because of their perceived 
similarities but crucial underlying differences. Tunisia experienced a popular 
uprising against the dictator Zine El Abedine Ben-Ali, who ruled the country for 
more than two decades. This uprising called for greater freedoms of expression and 
opinion, greater equality, greater political representation and transparency, and an 
end to police brutality and corruption. This revolt spread to Egypt and many other 
Arab countries in a wave of revolts, now known as the Arab Spring. In both 
countries, the popular movement managed to topple dictators who ruled with iron 
fists, backed up by powerful police and/or military structures. After this initial 
toppling, a transition from authoritarianism was initiated, with the end goal being, 
at best, the consolidation of a true democracy (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986:3).   
This paper seeks to enquire whether certain factors have eroded Egypt’s path to 
democratization to the extent that the regime, in fact, has not transitioned to another 
form of government. At the same time, the study looks at factors in Tunisia, to 
achieve a greater understanding of the differences between the two cases. The first 
democratically elected President of Egypt, Mohammed Morsi was toppled one year 
after he was elected by the Military. This military coup has led to increased political 
polarization and crackdown on dissent. Meanwhile, in Tunisia, the development has 
been quite different - the military did not intervene. A civilian national unity 
government was introduced. Though there have been security and legitimacy 
questions, and outright protests against the interim government, it never descended 
into chaos quite like in Egypt. There is the same political split in Tunisia as in Egypt, 
but Tunisians managed to negotiate a compromised solution, and draft a 
constitution taking into consideration many different aspects of the country and the 
people living in it.  
The question this paper aims to answer is therefore, why was there an authoritarian 
‘counter-coup’ in Egypt, and not in Tunisia? 
The comparative methodology will be expanded on and further defined in the 
forthcoming chapter on methods. Both Egypt and Tunisia are experiencing 
transitional processes, and because of this, the theoretical field of democratization 
and transitology are the most appropriate to apply to this study. This will be 
explained further in the third chapter. Chapter four will deal with the historical 
background to contextualize current events in the two countries. Finally, the 
analysis will be presented in chapter five, tying together the theories and fully 
answering the question. The conclusion will present the final findings and results 
of the study.  
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2 Methodology 
 
To narrow my interests down to a single question, it is essential for me to apply an 
appropriate methodology. The main purpose of this paper is to explain why the 
democratization process in Tunisia is doing better than Egypt’s. Therefore, I chose 
to apply a qualitative comparative case study approach. In the following section lies 
a more in-depth explanation of this methodology.  
 
2.1 Comparative Case Study  
 
Comparing the two cases is the best way to explain and understand the underlying 
factors and drivers of the difference in democratic development in Tunisia and 
Egypt (Teorell, 2012:226).  
I have chosen to apply John Stuart Mill’s “method of difference” (ibid). This 
approach aims to choose two or more cases that have similar characteristics such as 
population, religion, geographic location, political system, language, history etc. 
Tunisia and Egypt share many of these characteristics as they are both Arabic-
speaking countries with a majority Arab, Sunni Muslim population. They are both 
countries located in North Africa, both former European colonies, and both gained 
independence in the mid-20th century. Both Tunisia and Egypt had secular dictators 
who ruled their respective countries for decades through autocratic measures with 
large and extensive security apparatuses. The people of Tunisia and Egypt ousted 
their respective dictators, Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali through 
popular uprisings, and elected islamists to their governments. Both countries 
experienced backlash to these elections and huge protests once again threatened to 
topple newly elected islamists from power.  
Now, to explain my earlier proposition that, despite these similarities, in Tunisia 
"the democratization process is doing better"; let me point out three crucial 
differences between the two countries: the role of the military, political society, and 
the international context.   
Another methodological tool applied to support this study is interviews. The six 
interviews are conducted with people connected to both the Egyptian and Tunisian 
democratization processes. Among them are journalists, activists, analysts, and 
political actors (see Appendix 1). By applying an in-depth  interview technique, I 
aim to achieve particular and up-to-date insights, not readily retrievable from 
analysis of relevant literature (for more information about the interview, and 
interviewees, see Appendix 1 & 2).  
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2.2 Material 
 
Primary and secondary sources have been utulized to support this study. The 
primary sources are in the form of news articles and TV features from relevant 
agencies who cover these transitional processes. The secondary sources I have used, 
apart from interviews, are a number of scientific articles and books on 
democratization. For the historical background chapter, I use The Arabs by Eugene 
Rogan (2009) of the Oriental Studies faculty at Oxford University. To back up key 
events and dates I have used several scientific and journalistic articles from the past 
3 years from Tunisia and Egypt.  
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3 Theory  
 
This paper’s theoretical framework takes its root in certain, purposefully selected 
differences in both cases. Though many other factors surely influenced the 
difference in the outcome (independent variable), such as level of education, and 
size of population, I have chosen (due to limitations) to focus on the three factors I 
earlier mentioned, which I deem the most important – the influence of the military, 
political society, and international pressure. Within the vast study of 
democratization, this paper focuses on the temporal aspect of democratization – 
transitology. It studies the transition from authoritarianism, and looks at why some 
transitions lead to democracy and others do not.  
The theory of Transitology, according to Philippe C. Schmitter (2014), focuses on 
the transitional period when a country is moving away from an authoritarian 
government. When this ousting, revolution, or simple change is achieved there are 
four possible outcomes:  
1. A reversion to the same or a different form of autocracy.  
2. The formation of a hybrid-regime, which does not fully accomplish the criteria of 
a political democracy, but adopts some key institutions like voting – this is not a 
stable and lasting form of government, and will most likely revert either back to 
authoritarianism, or one day become a representative political democracy in its true 
form.  
3. The establishment of an ‘unconsolidated democracy’ which is stronger than the 
hybrid-regime and seems to fulfill all the minimal procedural criteria for 
democracy, but without a commonly accepted set of rules to regulate the political 
game between political forces.  
4. The fourth outcome is obviously the most desirable, namely, a fully consolidated 
democracy. This democracy shall have “consolidated via mutually acceptable rules 
and broadly valued institutions of civic freedom, political tolerance, and fair 
competition among its major actors.”  
It is clear that in Egypt, the outcome has been the first, namely, the reversion to the 
same autocratic tradition which was present before Mubarak’s ouster. In Tunisia, 
however, this is not the case, and according to Alfred Stepan, it has achieved the 
third outcome and is well on the way to become a fully consolidated democracy 
(Stepan, 2012).  
 
3.1 Influence of the Military 
 
According to, Bauman, Rittberger and Wagner (2001:40),  influence is measured 
by how actors use their capacities to control their political environment Throughout 
the Egyptian transitional process, the Egyptian military has effectively used their 
influence to preserve, and expand their influence over Egyptian politics.  
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The military plays a big role in Egypt, as the former head of its institution (General 
Abdel Fatah El Sisi) is now running for President with wide-spread popularity. 
During the transitional period, it is essential that the military be dealt with in a smart 
way. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:29-35) have many thoughts regarding the 
military, including how to diffuse a strong and politically active military, how to 
properly settle a past account involving military violence against its citizens, and 
the degree to which the former authoritarian regime was militarized  
The military has indeed expanded its influence in Egypt, and by analyzing the 
transitional process through transitology theory, I aim to prove how, in the case of 
Tunisia, the lack of that very military presence has deeply influenced that country's 
transition. (Stepan, 2012).   
 
3.2 Political Society 
 
Alfred Stepan, one of the most important scholars within the field of 
democratization, developed the Twin Tolerations theory, addressing the issue of 
religion in politics – specifically in “Arab spring countries” (Stepan, 2012). The 
twin tolerations is first the toleration of religious citizens of the authority of the 
state, and in turn the state’s toleration and welcoming of religious peoples into 
politics (ibid).  
Stepan refutes a common claim that religion stands as an obstacle towards 
modernization and democratization. Through extensive studies, involving the case 
of Tunisia, he comes to the conclusion that ‘hard secularism’ associated with 
France’s Third Republic is, in fact, an obstacle to democratization in itself. This is 
an important theoretical approach to be aware of, while analyzing the failings of the 
Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt, and the relative success of Ennahda in 
Tunisia.  
Stepan claims that Tunisia has successfully made a transition toward democracy, 
and now faces the difficult task of democratic consolidation1 (ibid). In both Tunisia 
and Egypt a vibrant and creative civil society was the backbone of the revolts 
toppling Mubarak and Ben Ali. However, the difference is that in Tunisia this 
translated into a relatively successful political society. From the perspective of 
Twin Tolerations theory, this happened because of the different political parties’ 
toleration towards each other, and the agreements and guarantees constructed in the 
aftermath of Ben Ali’s ousting (ibid).  
Negotiating pacts is another criteria essential to a successful transition towards 
democracy. In Egypt, pacts that were negotiated were never solidified during the 
Muslim Brotherhood administration. Contrastingly, in Tunisia, many political pacts 
were solidified and contributed to the drafting of the newly accepted constitution. 
A political pact is defined as an agreement, publically explicit or not, between a set 
of actors who wish to better define the basis of power, and protect their own “vital 
interests” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:37). Often these pacts are seen as 
                                                 
1 Not to say that this transition also has not caused turmoil, mass protests, political assassinations, and hurt the 
economy.  
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temporary solutions to ease tensions and avoid possible unwanted outcomes – like 
an authoritarian counter-coup.  
3.3 International Pressure 
 
The importance of the international dimension when discussing democratization 
and transitions from authoritarian systems is often disregarded. Eva Hansson 
describes2 in her article, both the impact domestic democratization has on 
international relations, and the impact international relations has on 
democratization (Gustavsson et al, 2014). 
Hansson describes how many Western nations have supported dictatorial military 
regimes in developing countries in the past and how this has perpetuated 
authoritarianism rather than democracy. Hansson also describes democracy-
inducing impacts of international relations. For example, geographic proximity, 
cultural exchange, media, academic exchange, social networks among other factors 
have proved to further democratic development (ibid).  
Global superpowers supporting dictatorships is highly relevant, considering 
Egypt’s annual receipt of $1.8 billion in military aid from the US.3 Similarly, David 
Cameron’s decision to launch an investigation into alleged terrorist plots by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the UK. It is also relevant when it comes to Tunisia’s 
relationship with France, and the fact that many of its migrant workers traveled 
there rather than to Saudi Arabia (as in Egypt) (Stepan, 2012).  
 
3.4 Overlaps 
 
It is crucial to point out that there are significant overlaps in these different factors. 
The military’s position internationally affects its domestic influence in Egypt. The 
international position of Tunisia has affected its political culture. Egypt’s military 
has influenced the country’s political culture, and so on and so forth. Overlaps in 
theory can be confusing, however, since each theory is relevant for each factor I do 
not choose to explicitly separate my theories, rather show how they link to each 
other. This will be elaborated upon in the analysis section.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 in her chapter of the yet-to-be released textbook on International Relations – Internationella Relationer. 
3 This is essentially the US pumping up the Egyptian military for its strategic importance for maintaining Israeli 
peace. 
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4 Historical Background 
 
Both Tunisia’s and Egypt’s modern histories are crucial for understanding current 
political events and contexts. The time frame for this historical background is not 
the same for both cases, because a further historical analysis is required in Tunisia, 
while in Egypt looking back to the time of national independence will suffice for 
the purposes of this paper. In Egypt I closely examine the military, for it is this 
institution that has shaped the political society of the country, while in Tunisia, I 
focus on their most powerful institutions within the Bourguiba and Ben-Ali 
regimes. 
 
4.1 Egypt 
 
In 1952 a charismatic Egyptian officer mounted a military coup against King 
Farouq, part of the same dynasty as was established in the early 19th century by 
Muhammed Ali4 (Rogan, 2009:140). This was Gamal Abdel Nasser, who would 
grow to be one of the most popular leaders in Arab history. Nasser was indeed a 
military man, and ran the country as such. Many of his policies were socialist, 
aiming to benefit the masses, but he did not tolerate political dissent or opposition. 
Thousands were arrested in Stalinist-styled purges where communists, Muslim 
Brothers, and former regime loyalists were thrown in jail (ibid:288).  
Nasser’s land reforms and anti-colonial actions gained him popularity and trust with 
Egyptians, as well as his defiance in the face of attack from Britain, France, and 
Israel when he nationalized the Suez Canal (ibid:339). Yet, he suffered a 
humiliating defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, and died three years later from a 
heart attack, marking the beginning of the end of Arab Nationalism (ibid:395).  
Nasser’s vice-president at the time, Anwar Sadat, was also a military man – part of 
the “Free Officer” group that ousted King Farouq in 1952 (ibid:408). One of the 
most crucial events of his presidency was the peace treaty with Israel. The peace 
treaty Sadat signed with Israel (starting the US’s annual military aid to Egypt at 
around $1.8 billion) had many consequences for Egypt’s geopolitical role in the 
Middle East, and the role of its military domestically. The most palpable 
consequence was his assassination by islamist extremists, who shot him dead during 
                                                 
4
 Although the military coup in 1952, abolishing Egypt’ monarchy, and establishing its first Republic may seem 
to be the most important precedent for military intervention in politics, it is not (Rogan, 2009:141). The Egyptian 
military intervened in domestic politics as early as 1881, in a time when the army represented the only viable 
opposition movement against colonial powers, including Ottoman and European empires (Ibid:137). Ahmad 
Urabi, a charismatic military leader, who was one of the first ethnically Egyptian commanders in the army (the 
army was traditionally made up of ethnic Turks, to assure allegiance to the Ottoman Empire), together with other 
officers set forth a list of demands to the Ottoman viceroy at the time, Khedive Tawfiq. According to scholar 
Eugene Rogan, this action set a “dangerous precedent of military men intervening in politics that would recur 
through Arab history across the twentieth century” (ibid:140).  
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a military parade which they had infiltrated, disguised in military fatigues (ibid, 
p.398).  
After Sadat’s assassination, his vice-president, Hosni Mubarak, also a former army 
officer, assumedthe presidency. Mubarak ruled for the next thirty years with the 
infamous “emergency law”5 in effect the entire time (The Family, 2012). According 
to the Al-Jazeera documentary, The Family, Mubarak seemed to embrace liberal 
reform in his early years, but quickly digressed to a more authoritarian governance, 
suppressing dissent and expanding his own powers and those of the notorious secret 
police (ibid).  
The relationship between the Mubarak regime and the main islamist opposition, the 
Muslim Brotherhood was complicated. However, it can be summed up by saying 
that the government selectively worked with the Brotherhood6, allowing them to 
function as a non-political social organization, and permitting limited political 
activity (ibid).  
However, Mubarak’s neglect of widespread displeasure ultimately led to his 
downfall. In February, 2011 Mubarak and his NDP (National Democratic Party) 
government (Al-Jazeera, 2011a). Mubarak handed over his powers to the SCAF 
(Supreme Council of Armed Forces). The SCAF orchestrated parliamentary and 
presidential elections in which the Muslim Brotherhood gained a majority in the 
parliament and won the presidency (ibid).  
A year after Mohammed Morsi was elected president, he was ousted by a military 
coup, following unprecedented protests against his rule (Kirkpatrick, 2013). This 
led to the military-appointed interim government. Defense minister Abdel Fattah 
Al-Sisi spearheaded this campaign which cracked down on the Muslim 
Brotherhood organization, jailing up to 20 000 people, and notoriously sentencing 
more than 500 people to death at a time (Kirkpatrick, 2014). Today, Sisi is running 
for president in a race no one doubts he will win.  
 
4.2 Tunisia 
 
Tunisia gained its independence from France four years after Nasser’s revolution 
in Egypt, in 1956 (Rogan, 2009, p.331).7 (ibid, p.330). In 1954, negotiations were 
initiated for Tunisia’s independence from France (ibid, p.331). Meanwhile the 
Tunisian nationalist movement was growing, with charismatic Habib Bourguiba in 
the forefront. Bourguiba founded the nationalist Neo-Destour party which, much to 
the ruling Bey’s displeasure, came to dominate the negotiations for independence 
                                                 
5 The emergency law was simply a way for Mubarak to justify the constant crackdown on any political dissent. It 
gave him and his government the power to disregard the constitution and have people arrested without suspicion 
or a fair trial (The Family, 2012).  
6 The Brotherhood were arguably the most powerful political group in Egypt, and were still up until Morsi’s 
ousting in 2013 (Naguib, 2014).  
7 Tunisia was a French protectorate, ruled by the France-friendly Husaynid Bey dynasty. The Husaynid Dynasty 
in Tunisia, like the dynasty started by Muhammed Ali in Egypt, were both remnants of the Ottoman Empire and 
served as viceroys for them (Ben Mabrouk, 2013).  
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(ibid). After two years of negotiations Tunisia adopted a new constitution and 
elected Habib Bourguiba as the new Tunisian republic’s president (ibid).  
Bourguiba was a self-proclaimed ally of the west, calling for peace between the 
Arabs and Israel. He was also a self-proclaimed pioneer in women’s rights (Pace, 
2000). However, shortly after his ascension to power, he altered the constitution, 
allowing him to be president for life (ibid).  
Bourguiba prioritized education, an enduring tradition in Tunisia8, and made birth 
control readily available, while also legalizing abortion (Ben Mabrouk, 2013). 
Another enduring legacy of Bourguiba’s was his complete separation of the military 
from politics, forbidding them from joining the ruling party (Barany, 2011). 
However, his collectivization campaigns within the agriculture sector, coupled with 
other factors led to near economic collapse. Throughout the 70’s and 80’s 
Bourguiba grew increasingly authoritarian – cracking down hard on political Islam 
(Pace, 2000). He was ousted in a bloodless coup by his newly appointed prime 
minister, Zine El Abedine Ben-Ali in 1987 – on the grounds that the president was 
not medically fit to carry out his duties (Ben Mabrouk, 2013).  
Ben Ali was not affiliated with the military at the time of  The Doctor’s Coup”. Ben 
Ali, like his predecessor, kept the military separate from the state, until its only 
function became “a small and modestly funded force focused on border control” 
(Barany, 2011). He also cracked down on political Islam (Redissi & Schraeder, 
2011). Ben Ali re-instated the institution of elections, but won every election with 
such a landslide that people had no doubt the system was corrupt (Cherif, 2014). 
He allowed parties to exist, but made it very difficult for them to function. 
According to Youssef Cherif, a Tunisian political analyst, Ben Ali’s Tunisia was, 
in fact, more authoritarian and less free than Mubarak’s Egypt. Ben Ali expanded 
his brutal secret police infrastructure and limited press freedoms (ibid).  
This was the framework of deepening country-wide tensions in which the self-
immolation by the 26 year old fruit vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi took place, 
literally igniting the Arab Spring (Redissi & Schraeder, 2011). Bouazizi’s self-
immolation mirrored the frustration many in Tunisia felt over poor socio-economic 
conditions and the brutal treatment from authorities (ibid). Wealthy Tunisians were 
also affected by poor conditions. Up to 45% of university-graduates were unable to 
find a job in Tunisia during Ben Ali (ibid).  
After Ben-Ali’s ouster, a civilian body assumed leadership of the transitional 
process. The head of the military, General Rachid Ammar, made it clear from the 
beginning that the military had no political stake in the future of Tunisia (ibid).   
The first free elections were held in October 2011 and the islamist party Ennahda 
won 41% of the seats in the 217-member constituent assembly. A government was 
appointed by the assembly, led by Ennahda’s former secretary-general, Hamadi 
Jebali as the Prime Minister (Stepan, 2012). During this time, a new constitution 
was written and approved by the people through elections. Although there were 
political tensions in the late summer of 2013, Jebali, unlike Morsi in Egypt, stepped 
down and agreed to relieve his powers to an interim government of technocrats to 
                                                 
8 Nearly all interviewees claim Tunisia’s education system to be much better than Egypt’s.  
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finalize the constitution and prepare the country for upcoming presidential and 
parliamentary elections (Economist, 2013).  
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5 Analysis 
 
5.1 Influence of the Military 
 
In a political transition from authoritarianism, O’Donnell and Schmitter emphasize the need 
for both “hard-liners” and “soft-liners” within the transitional government (O’Donnell & 
Schmitter, 1986:15). In Egypt, hard-liners in the form of the notoriously brutal SCAF took 
over the transitional process early on (Brown, 2013). Though its leadership positions were 
reshuffled under Morsi, the army remains one of the most important political players 
throughout Egypt’s so-far failed transition from authoritarianism. The Egyptian army, like the 
Tunisian one, did not fire upon its citizens when ordered to by the President, and ended up 
siding with the people on the issue of ousting their respective dictators (Barany, 2011). Why, 
then, is the army so important when comparing these two cases? And why has the army 
brought authoritarianism back to Egypt, while in Tunisia it completely stayed out of politics?  
5.1.1 Egypt 
 
“The role of the military in Egypt was to preserve itself, and the established 
institution of power”, (Eskandar, 2014).  
Egypt’s military has had such a big and privileged role in Egyptian politics and 
economy since Nasser’s military coup in 1952, making its biggest incentive 
preserving itself. The military in Egypt controls large portions of the Egyptian 
economy. Some say 20%, while others go so far as to say 40%9 (Tadros, 2012). 
Unlike in Tunisia, the Egyptian military did not “take sides” in the uprising of 2011 
until two and a half weeks into the revolt, analyzing which side would be more 
beneficial for them to stand with (Barany, 2011). When realizing that Mubarak’s 
tactics were failing, the military chose to convince the aging Mubarak to hand over 
the power to the SCAF (ibid). Stability and security being one of the army’s biggest 
priorities, they decided to give the people what they wanted by securing Mubarak’s 
departure, and permitting mass protests on Tahrir Square. However, the SCAF soon 
grew tired with many activists’ demands for transparency, justice against former 
regime loyalists, a more representative constituent assembly, increased acceptance 
for freedom of speech and human rights, and brutally cracked down on political 
activists and protestors in the months following Mubarak’s ouster (Brown, 2013).  
According to Brown, two things were necessary for Egypt’s democratic transition 
to be successful:  
1. “A broad agreement among elites on the rules of the transition” 
2. “A procedure that allowed people to express their will early without having all 
matters settled by backroom deals”  
Neither of these issues were settled when the military took over the transition in 
February 2011. The first thing the military did was suspend the constitution and 
                                                 
9 According to all the Egyptians I interviewed, the parliament has no insight in the military’s economy or budget 
whatsoever.  
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appoint an ex-judge to form an 8-man committee to suggest constitutional changes 
(Al-Jazeera, 2011b). The army deceived the people into thinking these were simply 
constitutional amendments when in actuality the constitutional changes were 
inserted into a new, military-drafted “constitutional declaration”, that would decide 
how the state would be run during the transition (Brown, 2013). Why did the 
military take control of the transitional process so early on, and why did it not leave 
it up to a civilian body to manage the transition?  
Dealing with the Military 
To best preserve their position, the military decided to play a very crucial role in 
Egypt’s transitional process. They became a sort of firewall, which any political 
actor would have to go through before achieving some kind of political victory. 
Like a firewall, they claim to be protecting the security of transitional aspirations 
of the Egyptian people. In Egypt, the military controls a large portion of the 
economy, has the largest electoral base, has no parliamentary oversight, has a wide 
international backing (both from Russia and the West), and currently dominates the 
transitional process. The Muslim Brotherhood realized from very early on that they 
would be forced to work with, rather than against, the military if they hoped to gain 
any kind of political victory (Naguib, 2014). This is, of course, not documented or 
proven, but one can assume a great deal of things from tracing the transitional 
process. 
According to an interview from The Guardian with Khalil Al-Anani (expert on 
Egyptian islamists at Durham University), the Muslim Brotherhood were not keen 
on partaking in protests against Hosni Mubarak in the early stages of the uprising 
(Shenker, 2011). However, after seeing the unprecedented number of protesters on 
the street, they decided to join. Contrary to the majority of secular youth 
organizations who partook in the protests, the Brotherhood is a secretive 
organization (much like the military in that sense) with no transparency in their 
leadership and actions (Roll, 2013).  
When the SCAF sent Egyptians to polling stations in March 2011 to vote on a set 
of constitutional amendments (or, rather, the military’s transitional roadmap), the 
Brotherhood urged their supporters to vote in favor of the proposed amendments, 
while secular youth activists urged their supporters to vote against the proposition 
(Naguib, 2014). Voting yes would mean that parliamentary and presidential 
elections would come sooner, rather than later, which would benefit the 
Brotherhood organization, as they had the biggest voter-base in the country at the 
time (Naguib, 2014). Naguib and Eskandar both believe that the military leadership 
and the Brotherhood leadership struck a deal about the transitional future of Egypt 
(Naguib, 2014) (Eskandar, 2014). The military agreed to let elections come sooner, 
while the Brotherhood vowed to work with the military - preserving their economic 
and political role domestically, and interntionally (ibid). 
“Everyone knows here in Egypt, whether it’s true or not, that the SCAF handed 
power over to the MB through negotiations, because it never announced the results 
when they had to” (Eskandar, 2014).   
The Brotherhood, once in power, had set a dangerous precedent – namely that the 
military is a necessary partner in order to achieve political victories. After 
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parliamentary elections in the winter of 2011/201210, the next phase of the military-
run transition was to draft a constitution. The constitution would be written by a 
hundred-man constituent assembly, which the parliament would choose in an 
indirect vote (Brown, 2013). The parliament decided to elect half of the members 
of the assembly from the parliament itself (dominated by islamists) and the other 
half from various social groups (where islamists were significantly represented) 
(ibid). This deepened the political and social divide in the country, with non-
islamist activists boycotting the process or trying to stop it altogether through 
judicial means (ibid). In terms of Twin Tolerations theory, this is an unwanted effect 
of a polarized religious society (Stepan, 2012).  
However, the constitutional process continued, and the next election – now for the 
presidency – came in May 2012. Because of the disproportionate strength of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF, the vote came down to a run-off between 
Mohammed Morsi of the Brotherhood and Ahmed Shafiq, a man who was even 
prime minister during Mubarak’s presidency. In a very close election, Morsi 
managed to win the presidency, only to realize that the army, through the SCC 
(Supreme Constitutional Court) had declared that the conditions under which the 
islamist-dominated parliament was elected were unconstitutional, and another 
ruling straight from the military stripped Morsi of most of his presidential powers 
(Brown, 2013).  
Once in power, Morsi did his best to reverse these changes, in a move that ended in 
total chaos. First, Morsi challenged the SCC ruling attempting to reinstate his much-
needed parliament, which failed. However, the next measures he took were more 
successful. Morsi managed to reverse the military-ruling, regaining the traditional 
presidential powers in Egypt. Next, he reshuffled the top of the uniformed 
leadership within the military, dismissing among others Field Marshall Tantawi and 
replacing him with Sisi, who now runs for president (ibid). As the deadline for the 
completion of the draft constitution approached, Morsi and his allies grew nervous, 
and in one of the most destructive moves in Egypt’s modern political history, Morsi 
granted himself the “powers of a God” (ibid) (Naguib, 2014). Morsi was now free 
to make constitutional changes without military or judicial oversight. He now had 
more power than Mubarak ever had, according to the constitution his constituent 
assembly was writing. This plunged the country into heavy polarization with street 
protests increasing, and calls for Morsi’s removal increasing (Brown, 2013). A 
referendum was held in the winter of 2012/2013 for the newly drafted constitution, 
where many of the opposition boycotted, bringing a mere 30% turnout. However, 
the constitution passed, making the next phase in Morsi’s plan to call for yet another 
election for the lower house of parliament which was deemed constitutionally 
illegal just about six months earlier (ibid).  
These elections never came to pass, because the military had now realized that their 
safest bet was not with Morsi, but against him. The Brotherhood was becoming 
unpopular amidst claims of Morsi wanting to turn Egypt into an authoritarian 
theocracy (ibid). Whether this was a valid fear or not, an organization named 
Tamarrod11 organized a movement calling for Morsi’s resignation. This ended in 
                                                 
10 In which the Muslim Brotherhood sponsored Freedom and Justice Party gained a majority of the seats, along 
with many salafies and other islamists (Brown, 2013).  
11 The Tamarrod movement may have started out as an independent activist organization, but many Egyptians 
believe the military funded their activities and deeply influenced their marketing strategies.  
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street protests on the 30th of July 2013 in the entire country. Much like when 
Mubarak was ousted, power was handed back to the military. However, this time it 
was through a military coup, fully legitimizing the military’s seizure of power, 
which is very problematic in terms of democratic transitions. Since then the military 
has drafted and adopted a new constitution for the country, chosen through 
elections12, and its defense minister has resigned from the military to run for 
president with only one opponent, the leftist Hamdeen Sabbahi who ran in the 
elections against Morsi (Essam El-Din, 2014).  
The military has reverted Egypt back to authoritarianism worse than during 
Mubarak, with the Muslim Brotherhood organization not only banned but labeled 
a ‘terrorist group’, with over 1000 of their members receiving death sentences in 
only two trials, and over 20,000 jailed (BBC, 2013). Many protesters have been 
killed since the military coup, including over 1000 people during the dispersing of 
a sit-in in August 2013 (ibid). The military-appointed interim government has also 
cracked down hard on secular dissent in the country, arresting many opposition 
figures (most of whom served jail sentences during Mubarak), claiming they broke  
Throughout the transitional process, which Brown neither defines as a true 
transition or something which brought about any positive change, the military were 
always present, and always working behind the scenes to preserve itself, so that it 
became impossible to operate without having to “gear their actions to the military’s” 
(Brown, 2013:52). Also, and more importantly, Egyptians have learned that dealing 
with the military is necessary to not become prosecuted, accused of being a spy, 
and/or being a terrorist.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Fearing Revenge 
A crucial point made by O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986:28) is that settling a past 
account with an institution of power like the military can prove to be a difficult task. 
During the period when the military took over power in the spring of 2011, and the 
current post-Morsi period, the Egyptian army has committed gruesome human 
rights violations (Nabuig, 2014). If they were held accountable, many high-ranking 
officials within the military structure could face international prosecution. 
Violations include the notorious “virginity tests” (incidentally Sisi’s idea and 
initiative) made on young women spending the night on Tahrir Square to 
systematically humiliate them, and the many brutal crackdowns of street protests, 
including the bloody dispersal of the anti-coup sit-in at the Raba’a Al Adawiya 
Square in Cairo (Butt, 2012) (Amnesty International, 2013). The military in Egypt 
has made itself directly responsible for many crimes against humanity, and 
therefore, fearing to lose its privileges and given role in Egypt’s political future, it 
will not permit political dissent and any challenge to its rule.  
O’Donnell and Schmitter (ibid:30) studied many cases in which transitions from 
authoritarian (but not necessarily to democratic) states occurred. They observed 
contextual differences, such as the military’s degree of involvement in these crimes, 
and to what extent these atrocities were truly horrific They found that in cases where 
the military had been involved, and the scars of the atrocities were very open and 
visible in the social psyche, the worst solution was to completely ignore it (ibid). 
                                                 
12 It was a landslide yes vote for the constitution, with 98% voting for it (Kingsley, 2014). This is more than 
vaguely reminiscent of Mubarak days when he would win election after election with over 90%, often an 
unusually high consensus in any democratic country about any issue.  
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To act like the atrocities never happened only helped to strengthen the military’s 
(or police’s) sense of “impunity and immunity” (ibid). It also serves as a blatant 
obstacle for the country’s political future, as in practice society would not just be 
ignoring past crimes, but also ethical values that are required in the country’s 
modern, functioning judicial system (ibid).  
In presidential candidate and former defense minister Sisi’s latest interview with 
state media, he emphasized Egypt’s commitment to cracking down on the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which has been labeled a terrorist organization (Eskandar, 2014a). 
Eskandar claims Sisi called for a larger police force13, while brushing “lightly over 
the topic of accountability over human rights violations” (ibid). If the worst thing 
Sisi can do is ignore the human rights violations against political opposition, then 
the worst has certainly come to pass.  
To make matters even worse, the crackdown on the Brotherhood and all their 
members and affiliates14 for their alleged crimes has given the military increased 
legitimacy. Lina Wardani, Egyptian journalist, claims that the Egyptian military, in 
fact, is not scared of retribution. She does not believe there will be any retribution 
either, from any future regime in Egypt (Wardani, 2014). Whether this is true or 
not, it gives insight into the political climate in Egypt and what kind of power the 
military has proven to be.  
 
5.1.2 Tunisia 
 
In extremely stark contrast to Egypt, the Tunisian military played a much more 
quiet and insignificant role in the Tunisian transitional process, which Stepan 
(2012) has proclaimed to be a successful one.. Like the Egyptian military, the 
Tunisian refused to fire upon its citizens, but unlike the Egyptian military, did not 
and was not expected to take over the transitional process and form its own ‘SCAF’ 
(Barany, 2011). There are many reasons for this, including political society and the 
international context. In Tunisia, as has been explained in the previous section on 
the country’s historical background, the founding dictator Habib Bourguiba, and 
his successor, Zine El Abedine Ben Ali, both kept the military small. They also took 
heavy measures to separate the military from politics and the economy (ibid). 
Instead, the military was modestly funded and had no incentive to preserve any 
status of affluence and political influence as it had none to begin with (ibid). The 
military sided with the people and secured the installation of the country’s civilian 
transitional entity, enforcing the ban on former regime loyalists and members of 
Ben Ali, or any other party under his dictatorship from participating in politics 
(ibid). Another important factor in the military’s weakness in Tunisia is the lack of 
an international importance.  
To study why the transitional process was so much more successful in Tunisia than 
in Egypt, it is less significant to examine the Tunisian military as such, because they 
                                                 
13 the same notorious authority which killed countless political dissidents before, during, and after the uprising of 
2011 
14 Three Al-Jazeera journalists have been in Egyptian jails for several months pending a trial against them for the 
crime of interviewing members of the Brotherhood (Al-Jazeera 2014).  
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did not participate in politics. The military’s lack of action throughout the 
transitional process certainly is a factor that has helped Tunisia during its transition.   
 
5.2 Political Society 
 
5.2.1 Tunisia’s Transition 
 
Tunisia’s transition started, not with a military-led transitional council, but with an 
elected constituent assembly, who then elected a transitional government (Stepan, 
2012). Much like in early Egyptian elections, the major islamist movement Ennahda 
won a majority of the seats in this constituent assembly This assembly then elected 
Hamadi Jebali (former secretary-general of Ennahda) as prime minister, and 
human-rights activist Moncef Marzouki as president. This government was 
installed in December 2011 and had the task to draft a new constitution, which 
would lead to new governmental elections after its completion (ibid). However, 
Tunisia has not experienced a smooth process since then, but much like Egypt, has 
had several obstacles and political tensions on the way. Much like in Egypt, the 
secular opposition parties and the islamists did not see eye to eye, and a political 
and societal divide was beginning to emerge. Two crucial events served as catalysts 
for what could have plunged the country into total chaos.  
On February 13th, 2013 a well-known Tunisian leftist politician and lawyer was 
gunned down by a militant islamist while leaving his home (The Economist, 2014). 
Anti-Ennahda protests were heard across the country just hours after the 
assassination. Many accused Ennahda and Salafi movements to have been involved 
in the assassination. Whether this is true or not, it prompted the Ennahda-led 
government to reshuffle its prime minister, foreign minister, and justice minister 
positions, seemingly diffusing the situation A few months later another top secular 
opposition figure named Mohammed Brahmi was assassinated in July 2013. This 
prompted even bigger street protests and outrage from the secular opposition (ibid). 
A few days after the assassination of Brahmi, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
was ousted by a military coup – allegedly legitimized by popular support for their 
actions. This showed Ennahda and Tunisians how fragile the transitional process 
was, and after several months of political deadlock and protests, an agreement was 
finally reached between Ennahda and the secular opposition. The Ennahda-led 
government stepped down in January 2014, to be replaced by a group of neutral 
technocrats who would lead the country until the next elections, which Ennahda 
will be permitted to participate in (ibid). A new constitution was also adopted, 
around the same time as Egypt’s, which many claim to be the most progressive in 
the Arab World. So why is Egypt facing a military dictatorship while Tunisia is 
paving the way for a party-plural democracy? Although the lack of a military 
institution bent on preserving the status quo is certainly important, it is highly 
significant to contextualize Tunisian politics in terms of political society.  
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Twin Tolerations 
As mentioned in the previous section on historical background, Ben Ali’s Tunisia 
was a police state, but not a military state (Barany, 2011). When Ben Ali was ousted 
and exiled in early 2011, there were no incentives for any political institution or 
entity to preserve the status quo, everyone wanted change. This paved the way for 
Tunisia’s diverse and pluralistic political society and culture.  
Whereas in Egypt the SCAF took over, in Tunisia a commission called the Ben 
Achour Commission set up a coalition of representatives from all the newly 
legalized political parties and civil society groups (Stepan, 2012). According to 
Stepan, this turned out to be “one of the most effective consensus-building bodies 
in the history of ‘crafted’ democratic transitions” (ibid). This diverse commission 
set up the rules of the transition, which it set to a vote in the spring of 2011. An 
overwhelming majority of the commission voted in favor of the proposed 
transitional package, and from there the transition was able to emerge. One of the 
most crucial decisions in this package was to draft and implement a new 
constitution before electing an official government, because as almost all of the 
people I interviewed have said about Egypt: “how can we vote for a president or 
parliament when we do not know what powers he/she/they will have?” (Naguib, 
2014) (Eskandar, 2014) (Wardani, 2014). Instead of voting for members of 
parliament, Tunisians voted for members of a constituent assembly. According to 
Stepan, the idea of Twin Tolerations were adhered to during this transition because, 
for the most part, secular and islamist politicians have respectfully negotiated with 
each other (Stepan, 2012).  
It is clear that the constitution-drafting process in Tunisia was much more 
transparent and inclusive than the Egyptian one. According to a Tunisian activist I 
interviewed, Aïda Khemiri, civil society groups could follow the drafting of the 
constitution due to its transparency, and if something would come up that seemed 
undemocratic, they would organize demonstrations outside of the parliament 
building (Khemiri, 2014). Tunisian political society has been able to stay on the 
path of democratization despite political assassinations, turmoil, and mistrust 
between seculars and islamists. The same political turmoil and polarization existed 
in Egypt, so why, other than the lack of a military leading the transition, did Tunisia 
establish a successful political society while Egypt did not?  
To answer this question, we must look to Tunisia’s historical political society. 
Stepan dates Tunisia’s political society back to the days of Ibn Khaldoun (1332-
1406), the celebrated political philosopher (Stepan, 2012). Due to relative 
autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, Tunisia grew to become the most liberal and 
tolerant nation in the Arab World in the mid 19th-century (ibid). Tunisia drafted the 
Arab World’s first constitution, which according to historian Albert Hourani, left 
its mark by forming a new political consciousness in Tunis (ibid). Two main 
institutions, the Islamic-based Zeitouna Mosque University, and the secular Sadiki 
College worked together to influence the drafting of this constitution, which 
abolished slavery before the US and France did (ibid). The strength of these 
institutions working together (one religious, one secular) has contributed to the 
more twin-tolerant mindset of many Tunisians until today.  
Stepan describes the years in which Habib Bourguiba took over as “the lost 
decades”, due to his harsh modernization techniques (ibid). Bourguiba was the 
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opposite of twin-tolerant, in effect banning religion in public life. He immediately 
closed down the religious Zeitouna University, cut the teaching of religion in public 
schools to one hour a week, shut down private koranic schools and required teachers 
to speak French as well as Arabic (ibid). Both Bourguiba and his successor Ben Ali 
gained great legitimacy by claiming that if they were not in power, an islamist 
theocracy would replace them, like what happened in Iran in 1979 (ibid). This, 
however, has proven not to be true.  
In 2003, a “Call from Tunis” was issued by the four major opposition parties to Ben 
Ali’s rule from their exile in France (Ennahda, CPR, Ettakatol, and PDP) which all 
took part in the transitional process through the constituent assembly (Stepan, 
2012). The result of their negotiations was a document which supported the idea of 
twin-tolerations and affirmed their will to look to a future past Ben Ali (ibid). It 
embraced “respect for the people’s identity and its Arab-Muslim values”, 
guaranteeing “liberty of beliefs to all and the political neutralization of places of 
worship”. It also ensured that any government after Ben Ali would be “founded on 
the sovereignty of the people as the sole source of legitimacy” (ibid). In other words, 
any future government would have to be a civil and secular one, but Ben Ali’s anti-
islamist tactics would cease. These political parties kept meeting and negotiating 
outside of Tunisia throughout the 2000’s, reaching more and more agreements on 
crucial issues, such as the family code and gender equality (ibid). This cooperative 
political society, and the lack of a powerful authoritarian institution of power such 
as the Egyptian military, served as a strong basis for the transition to democracy in 
Tunisia. They have also appointed a new constitution, claimed by many of the 
people I interviewed to be one of the most progressive in the Middle East.  
5.2.2 Egypt’s (lack of) Political Society 
 
Wardani claims that prior to the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, both countries had 
creative and impressive civil societies who organized the protests that brought down 
Ben Ali and Mubarak (Wardani, 2014). However, many remain baffled as to why 
this was not translated into a political society in Egypt as described in the previous 
section. As described above, the military in Egypt was influential in breaking down 
the political society, but the influence of the military is not the only factor 
contributing to Egypt’s lack of a political society.  
The most important factor contributing to this was the lack of building pacts 
between islamists and secular opposition movements prior to the uprising. Whereas 
Ennahda in Tunisia were in negotiations with secular parties as early as 2003, the 
Muslim Brotherhood was a secretive organization at the time who were arguably 
less moderate than Ennahda (Stepan, 2012). Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt was not strictly a non-regime political party like Ennahda, but were more 
incorporated in the political system during Mubarak (ibid). As described in the 
historical section, the Brotherhood in Egypt was working with the Mubarak regime, 
participating in political processes as independents (Naguib, 2014).  
Another factor is the unwillingness of the Brotherhood leadership to establish a 
political consensus with secular forces in Egypt. Stepan claims to have interviewed 
three top Brotherhood officials who stood by their 2007 claim that “no woman or 
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Christian could make an acceptable president of Egypt”15 (Stepan, 2012). Shortly 
afterword, Stepan interviewed Ghannouchi, asking him what he thought of this 
statement. His answer: “Democracy means equality of all citizens. Such a platform 
excludes 60 percent of all the citizens and is unacceptable” (ibid). This clearly 
shows the difference in the two islamist movements, and the degree to which they 
are willing to work with secular forces to build a consensus-style democracy.  
Although there certainly are secular forces both in Tunisia and Egypt, the fact of 
the matter is that the islamist movements in both countries were the most popular. 
This was clearly proven through elections in both countries (ibid). This meant, for 
secular forces, that cooperation and negotiation with the islamists was absolutely 
necessary. In Egypt, however, this did not happen at all. There was no “call from 
Tunis” prior to the uprising, and because of the military’s takeover of the 
transitional process, secular and islamist parties often turned to the army instead of 
each other. Whereas in Tunisia, seculars and islamists had been in negotiations 
since 2003, this did not happen in Egypt until the islamists gained the presidency 
(ibid).  
According to Eskandar the problem was not that Morsi refused to engage in 
negotiations and deals with seculars, but that he made many promises and 
guarantees to secular forces without acting upon them (Eskandar, 2014). The most 
famous of these promises was Morsi’s commitment to appointing a female, 
Christian vice-president (ibid). This promise, along with many others made to the 
seculars were completely disregarded by the Morsi administration, angering the 
seculars who subsequently refused to engage in any kind of dialogue with Morsi 
(ibid). Morsi completely bulldozed over the secular parties, who, in the end, decided 
to side with the military rather than see Morsi continue his rule. This is why many 
secular forces such as the Social Democrats openly supported the military coup and 
were a part of the protests against Morsi in the summer of 2013 (Amin, 2013).  
This displays an important difference between the two countries: Egypt, failing to 
build political pacts, while Tunisia succeeds.  
 
5.3 International Pressure 
 
Eva Hansson writes that traditional democratization and transitology theories have 
disregarded the complexities which accompany regime-change (Gustavsson et al, 
2014, ch.18). According to Hansson, regime-change is not simply a linear process 
that starts with political liberalization and ends with democratic consolidation, it is 
rather a much more complex process.  
International pressure (or the lack of it) in the Arab World can explain a lot of the 
outcomes of the Arab Spring countries after the mass demonstrations were initiated. 
In Bahrain, a coalition of Gulf-countries assisted the Bahraini government to 
completely silence the revolutionary movement (Holmes, 2014). In Libya, a 
                                                 
15 This is a very powerful claim, not only in terms of gender (in)equality, but also because around 10% of 
Egyptians are Christians (CIA World Factbook, 2012).  
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coalition of Western countries assisted the revolutionaries by creating a “no-fly 
zone”, effectively deeming Qadaffi’s air force useless (Al-Jazeera, 2011c).  
The reasons why countries sometimes engage their militaries in foreign conflicts, 
and sometimes do not, are often geopolitically strategic. For Western powers like 
the US to demand China democratize would be unthinkable, it might lead to a world 
war, but to invade Iraq was perceived as less of a threat, plus it might have created 
a ‘snowball’ effect (and arguably a strategic resource abundant in Iraq).  
Clinton claimed early on during the uprising that the US supports “the fundamental 
right of expression and assembly for all people”, while going on to say that the US’s 
“assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to 
respond to legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people” (Reuters, 2011). 
How much more contradictory can one get? The so-called stable government of 
Egypt was a corrupt dictatorship which was actively shooting down demonstrators, 
and had a history of denying the fundamental rights of expression and assembly. 
Did Clinton not know this? It is very unlikely that she did not, but there are some 
fundamental differences in Egypt and Tunisia which explains why the US did 
‘meddle’ in Egypt’s politics, while leaving Tunisia completely alone.  
Egypt is the most populous Arab country, with one of the strongest Arab armies, 
which also happens to share a border with Israel (CIA, 2014). The US has a tradition 
of supporting authoritarian regimes around the world, notably in Latin America and 
the Middle East, in order to ‘contain’ communism or more recently political Islam 
and terrorism. The US supported the Mubarak regime throughout his 33-year rule 
for fear of an alternative that would be hostile to Israel. This is also the reason for 
the US’s annual contribution of $1.8 billion dollars to Egypt’s defense budget (AP, 
2014). One of the US's most important policies in the Middle East is to ensure 
security for their long-term ally, Israel, and in this context support for 
democratization is conditional on that priority (ibid). Although the US temporarily 
suspended this aid amidst Sisi’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and secular 
political dissent, it has vowed to resume it as of May, 2014 (ibid). It is clear that the 
US does not have a problem with returning to its policy of supporting an 
authoritarian Egypt, rather than see it democratize because of perceived risks. Wael 
Eskandar puts it simply: “One must look at America’s rationale…how would it be 
in America’s best interest to keep Egypt on a democratic route? How does this 
benefit the US?” (Eskandar, 2014).  
Contrastingly, Tunisia is a relatively insignificant country in the international 
context. It is a small country with a much smaller population than Egypt, and does 
not share a border with Israel. France was also known for its ties to the Ben-Ali 
regime, and indeed, the French foreign minister at the time confirmed the shipping 
of tear gas and other means to battle protesters just days before Ben Ali was ousted 
(Willsher, 2011). However, because of this embarrassing fact, coupled with her 
‘vacation’ in Tunisia during the uprising, her resignation became inevitable (ibid).  
Hansson claims that international pressure such as world powers supporting 
dictatorships can promote authoritarianism and actively work against 
democratization, but she also claims that international exchanges can very much 
promote democracy (Gustavsson et al, 2014, ch.18). The fact that many exiled 
Tunisian political parties and actors (notably Rachid Ghannouchi, founder of 
Ennahda) were based in France is quite significant (Stepan, 2012). Although one 
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can argue over whether France’s democracy is as fully-fledged as it claims to be, 
but it is indeed more democratic than Mubarak’s Egypt or Ben Ali’s Tunisia was. 
Stepan claims that Ghannouchi and Ennahda’s exposure to the international 
community caused them to be more moderate and less dogmatic than the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Eygpt (ibid).  
 
5.4 Overlaps 
 
As noted in the theories section, one cannot overlook the overlaps between the 
causal factors discussed above. Because of this, and the confusion it may instill, I 
have chosen to take a short section to comment upon this.  
 
5.4.1 Military Influence – Political Society 
 
Undoubtedly, the fact that Egypt’s transitional process was controlled by the 
military, and that it was not in Tunisia, is significant. The influence of the military 
has indeed affected Egypt’s political society, most often in a negative way – by 
pitting polarized actors and groups against each other only to swoop in and 
reestablish ‘order’, or simply to “divide and conquer” as Lina Wardani puts it 
(Wardani, 2014). Similarly, in Tunisia the lack of a military influence is significant 
in itself because the political society was allowed to fully blossom. However much 
these causal factors seem to be linked, it is still important to note that regardless of 
a military influence, Tunisia’s main islamist force was exiled in France (as noted in 
the above section), while Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood remained in the Egyptian 
political system. Therefore, it is still important to keep these causal factors separate 
rather than speak of the military influence as the only one to be significant.  
5.4.2 Political Society – International Pressure 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, a big reason for the fact that Tunisia’s 
political society is more successful than Egypt’s is that it gained much experience 
from international exposure. However, this is not the only reason. Tunisia’s 
political history, as well as the willingness of its political groups and actors to 
cooperate and build consensus is the main reason for its relative success in political 
society. International pressure such as the US’s military contribution to Egypt can 
explain certain aspects of Egypt’s political society, but this is also too simplistic of 
an explanation, which is why these causal factors also have remained separate.  
 
5.4.3 International Pressure – Military Influence  
 
 
Although the US’s military aid to Egypt has made a lot of Egypt’s military influence 
stronger, the military would not have been able to thrive unless it could play upon 
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their popularity and their history as protectors of Egypt. Similarly, the lack of 
significant international contributions to Tunisia’s military is not the only reason 
for its refrain from political participation, it is also due to Tunisia’s political history. 
Therefore, these causal factors have also remained separate.  
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6 Conclusion  
 
In the middle of a question I was about to pose to Lina Wardani, she interrupted me 
and said: 
“Can I just say something? Yes there are differences, and I recall the same kind of 
questions since the uprising on the street, in seminars, on the radio, in culture cafés, 
but I still feel that the cases had very similar positions” (Wardani, 2014).  
This is the crux of my study. Tunisia and Egypt were so very similar going into 
these revolts that to imagine the outcomes being so different today would be very 
hard to do in January, 2011. However, I believe I have pointed out the most 
important three causal factors, namely the different degree of military influence, the 
difference in political society, and the difference in international pressure.  
As mentioned in the section above on overlaps, these three causal factors are of 
course dependent on each other, but without each isolated factor, the difference in 
outcome would not be the same. Through this study I have shown that Egypt’s 
military influence caused their transition to go rotten, and double back on itself, 
while the lack of a significant military influence in Tunisia moved them farther 
away from authoritarianism. I have shown that political society and the degree to 
which it can affect high politics matters, and fosters democratization processes. This 
has given Tunisia the transitional edge it need to successfully move forward. 
Finally, I have shown that international pressure (or the lack of it) matters. In Egypt, 
peace and stability were prioritized above human rights and democracy, while in 
Tunisia international exchanges and the lack of international ‘meddling’ gave it yet 
another edge in its democratic transition.  
In conclusion, these countries will probably keep transitioning in some form of 
direction, but what the result of this process starting with the Jan/Feb 2011 
uprisings, cannot be foretold now. However, with this paper I have aimed to explain 
the transitional outcomes so far, through my comparison of Egypt’s failure to 
Tunisia’s success.  
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8 Appendices  
 
8.1 Appendix 1 
 
SOral Interviews 
 
Name Affiliation Date Duration Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Method 
Youssef 
Cherif 
Tunisian analyst, 
archeologist 
 
April 28th, 
2014 
20 minutes Tunis, 
Tunisia 
Skype 
Interview 
Wael 
Eskandar 
Egyptian 
journalist 
April 15th, 
2014 
23 minutes Cairo, Egypt  Skype 
Interview 
Aïda 
Khemiri 
Tunisian 
blogger/activist 
April 26th, 
2014 
23 minutes Tunis, 
Tunisia 
Skype 
Interview 
Mina 
Naguib 
Egyptian 
blogger/activist 
April 18th, 
2014 
20 minutes Stockholm, 
Sweden 
Personal 
Interview 
Alexandra 
Sandels 
Former L.A. 
Times Middle 
East 
Correspondent 
April 19th, 
2014 
23 minutes Stockholm, 
Sweden 
Personal 
Interview 
Lina 
Wardani 
Egyptian 
journalist/activist 
May 11th, 
2014 
18 minutes Cairo, Egypt Skype 
Interview 
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8.2 Appendix 2 
 
Interview Guide 
x: Question discussed with respondent.  
List of Sample 
Questions 
Youssef 
Cherif 
Wael 
Eskandar 
Aïda 
Khemiri 
Mina 
Naguib 
Alexandra 
Sandels 
Lina 
Wardani 
In your opinion, is 
Tunisia ‘doing 
better’ in terms of 
democratization 
than Egypt? 
Why/Why not? 
x x x x x x 
How does the 
Ennahda Party 
and the Muslim 
Brotherhood 
differ? How are 
they Similar? 
x x  x  x 
How autonomous 
is Egypt’s 
military? 
 x  x  x 
What is the 
significance of 
Tunisia’s new 
constitution? 
x  x  x x 
How has the 
international 
community 
reacted/acted 
toward the revolts 
in Egypt/Tunisia? 
 x  x x  
Why did dialogue 
and compromise 
fail in Egypt? 
 x  x  x 
How did dialogue 
and compromise 
succeed in 
Tunisia? 
x x x  x  
What kind of 
political and civic 
society existed in 
Tunisia/Egypt 
before and after 
the revolts? 
x x x  x x x  
Does the fact that 
Ennahda was 
exiled while the 
Brotherhood was 
not have any 
significance? 
x x x x x  x 
Edgar Mannheimer  STVK02 
   
33 
 
Was the 
constitution-
drafting in 
Egypt/Tunisia a 
transparent 
proceeding? 
x x x x x x 
How did the 
constitution-
drafting look like 
in Tunisia/Egypt 
x x x x x x 
Is Egypt/Tunisia 
of geopolitical 
importance 
internationally? 
x x   x x 
How did/are civil 
society groups 
operating during 
the transitional 
process? 
  x x x  
Will the 
Tunisian/Egyptian 
constitution be 
implemented? 
x x x x x x 
 
 
